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Hopkins: Supreme Court Leaks and Recusals: A Response to Professor Steven

SUPREME COURT LEAKS AND RECUSALS: A
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR STEVEN LUBET’S
SCOTUS ETHICS IN THE WAKE OF NFIB V.
SEBELIUS
Kevin Hopkins∗
[P]eople know that something is wrong. They sense the
imbalances, the unfairness in the justice system. They suspect
that the playing field and the rules of the game favor the rich
and powerful, but they may not know what to do about it.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, it would have been rare and almost unheard of to
see a U.S. Supreme Court Justice give an interview on television or
radio,2 attend a public function, give a speech or lecture, accept a gift
from an organization with a particular political bend, discuss a decided
case while still sitting on the Court, or go on a friendly hunting trip with
a person who is a party-litigant in a lawsuit pending before the Court.3
Times have changed, however.
∗

Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL. I am grateful to
Associate Dean Jeremy Telman and members of the faculty at Valparaiso University Law
School for the invitation to participate in the roundtable discussion at the 2012 Tabor
Lecture in Legal Ethics. I am also grateful to the members of the Valparaiso University
Law Review for providing great editorial assistance for this response. Lastly, I thank
Professor Steven Lubet for writing such a timely and provocative article and for delivering
a great lecture.
1
RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, NO CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE
PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 193 (1996).
2
On Sunday, January 13, 2013, CBS’s 60 Minutes aired a recent interview of Supreme
Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor with CBS Television Anchor Scott Pelley. See Justice
Sotomayor Prefers “Sonia from the Bronx,” CBSNEWS (Jan. 13, 2013, 5:00 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=50138923n. During the interview, Justice
Sotomayor indicated that she had benefited from affirmative action, but was mindful and
careful not to comment on Fisher v. University of Texas, the Court’s recent affirmative action
case. Id. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (granting a petition for writ of
certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review of the
constitutionality of the University of Texas Law School admissions policies); Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) (considering the use of race in undergraduate
admissions at the University of Texas).
3
See Steven Lubet & Clare Diegel, Stonewalling, Leaks, and Counter-Leaks: SCOTUS
Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 883, 889 (2013) (discussing
numerous instances where the conduct of Justices have been questioned (e.g., the
acceptance of gifts, outside speaking engagements, the accuracy of financial disclosure
forms, recusal, confidentiality, etc.)); see also Kevin Hopkins, The Politics of Misconduct:
Rethinking How We Regulate Lawyer-Politicians, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 839, 908–910 (2005)
(providing a detailed discussion of the ethical concerns raised when Justice Antonin Scalia
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The ethical conduct and behavior of members of the nation’s highest
court have been questioned by the public and the legislature on many
occasions. For example, ethical concerns regarding the behavior of
Supreme Court Justices have been raised in situations, just to name a
few, where a Justice fails to recuse herself from participating in a
decision when the Justice may have a personal stake in the outcome,
such as holding stock in a corporation that is a litigant in a pending case
before the Court,4 where a spouse of a Justice has taken a highly
publicized position against a highly contested and debated law that is
slated for Supreme Court review,5 or where a Justice has failed to recuse
herself from participating in a case where she played an important if not
key role in writing and advocating legislation that ultimately reaches the
Court for constitutional review.6
As Professor Steven Lubet notes in his article, Stonewalling, Leaks, and
Counter-Leaks: SCOTUS Ethics in the Wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, the ethical
conduct of Supreme Court Justices has once again gained national
attention. This time, however, the context for public outcry is due to
actions of an in-house source who released confidential information to a
member of the press concerning the voting behavior and the overall
accompanied Vice President Dick Cheney on a duck hunting trip only three weeks after the
Court had agreed to hear arguments in Cheney v. United States District Court, 540 U.S. 1088
(2003)); David G. Savage, Trip With Cheney Puts Ethics Spotlight on Scalia: Friends Hunt
Ducks Together, even as the Justice Is Set to Hear the Vice-President’s Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2004, at A-1 (providing details of the Scalia-Cheney trip); David G. Savage & Richard A.
Serrano, Scalia Was Cheney Hunt Trip Guest; Ethics Concern Grows, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at
A-12 (opining that as more details of the trip have emerged, the impartiality of Justice
Scalia is in doubt). In a response to the Los Angeles Times inquiry, Justice Scalia stated:
Social contacts with high-level executive officials (including cabinet
officers) have never been thought improper for judges who may have
before them cases in which those people are involved in their official
capacity, as opposed to their personal capacity. For example, Supreme
Court Justices are regularly invited to dine at the White House,
whether or not a suit seeking to compel or prevent certain presidential
action is pending.
Savage, supra.
4
See John Berlau, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Fails to Recuse Herself, INSIGHT MAG., July 28,
1997, at 12 (noting that Justice Ginsburg had failed to recuse herself in Bankers Trust Co. v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 516 U.S. 1041 (1996) and Exxon Corp. v. Youell, 516 U.S. 801 (1995),
cases where her husband owned stock in one of the litigating companies).
5
See Joan Biskupic, Calls for Recusal Intensify in Health Care Case: Kagan, Thomas
Questioned, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 2011, at 6A (noting concerns raised by House Democrats
that Justice Thomas recuse himself from participating in the Court’s review of the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act because of his wife’s vigorous and public
opposition to the law).
6
See id. (noting concerns raised by Republican Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)
concerning Justice Elena Kagan’s involvement while Solicitor General of the United States
in the defense of the Affordable Care Act).
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sentiments of members of the Court’s minority in one of the most
significant and controversial rulings of the year: NFIB v. Sebelius (the
“Affordable Care Act”).7 Professor Lubet uses this leaking of significant
and confidential information regarding the Court’s deliberations in the
Affordable Care Act case as a segue into what he believes is a much
larger group of issues—those concerning Supreme Court ethics and
regulation of the conduct of members of the Court, the need for the
adoption by the Court of a comprehensive code of judicial conduct to
govern the actions of the Justices, and the need for reform of the Court’s
recusal process and practices.8
Just like Professor Lubet, I also signed the nonpartisan letter that was
drafted and sent by a group of law professors to the Chairman and
Ranking Minority Members of the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees, which called for the implementation of mandatory and
enforceable rules to protect the integrity of the Supreme Court.9 And just
like Professor Lubet, members of academia, and the sponsors of H.R.
862,10 I too believe that the adoption of ethics rules to govern Supreme
Court Justices would provide greater transparency with regards to
judicial decision-making at the Supreme Court level and consistency in
practices such as recusal, and would bolster public confidence in the
integrity of the Court. However, unlike Professor Lubet, I believe that
the uniqueness of the Supreme Court and its role as contemplated by the
Constitution’s Framers will require, in many instances, deference by the
legislative branch of the national government, even when the conduct by
a Justice might otherwise raise significant ethical concerns.11
In my response, I briefly evaluate the validity of a few of Professor
Lubet’s comments and arguments addressing some of these issues, the
viability of his suggestion for adopting a comprehensive code of judicial

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); see also Lubet, supra note 3, at 883–86.
See generally Lubet, supra note 3; see also 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006) (discussing
disqualification of justices, judges, and magistrate judges).
9
See Letter from 138 Law Professors to the House and Senate Judiciary Comms. (Mar.
17, 2011), available at http://www.afj.org/judicial_ethics_sign_on_letter.pdf (providing the
letter to Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members regarding the adoption of a
comprehensive code of judicial ethics for Supreme Court Justices).
10
See H.R. 862, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (2011) (establishing procedures for recusal of
Supreme Court Justices). House Bill 862 was introduced by Congressmen Chris Murphy
(D-Conn.) and Anthony Weiner (D-N.Y.). Id. The Bill would apply the Judicial
Conference’s Code of Conduct to Supreme Court Justices and would give the Judicial
Conference the ability to enforce the Code of Conduct when violated by a Justice. Id. § 2.
11
See CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
(Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.
pdf (making a case for not adopting a comprehensive code of judicial ethics on the grounds
of the uniqueness of the Supreme Court).
7
8
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conduct to govern members of the Court, and his ideas for reforming the
Court’s recusal process. I conclude by sharing a few of my own thoughts
and suggestions on these important issues.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION
Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.12
The U.S. Supreme Court is the only federal court specifically
mandated under Article III of the Constitution.13 Justices sitting on the
Court have assumed as their major responsibilities the task of assuring
state and federal government compliance with the Constitution and
other federal laws, along with the task of acting as a check on the
exercise of powers by the executive and legislative branches of the
national government.
In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton stated that the judiciary
branch was “designed to be an intermediate body between the people
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter
within the limits assigned to their authority.”14 As noted by Hamilton,
the Court was created primarily as a check on the executive and
legislative branches of the national government for the protection of the
people.15 The Framers believed that to best protect the people the
judicial offices required a cloak of permanent tenure in order to create
the independent spirit in judges essential for the faithful performance of
the duties of that role.16
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
Id.
14
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., Liberty Fund 2001).
15
Id. at 406–07.
16
Id. at 407; see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59–60
(1982) (holding that a fundamental principle enunciated in the Constitution is that the
“‘judicial Power of the United States’ must be [placed] in an independent Judiciary” and
that the Constitution provides “clear institutional protections for that independence,” such
as the salary and tenure provisions of Article III of the Constitution). Supreme Court
12
13
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Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution states:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—
between a State and Citizens of another State;—between
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the
same State claiming Land under the Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.17
Article III of the Constitution provides the Supreme Court with original
jurisdiction to adjudicate cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and those in which a state is a party.18
Additionally, the Constitution provides that in all other cases the Court
has appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact with such exceptions
and regulations as created by Congress.19
While Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides for the creation of
the Supreme Court, it is silent with regards to what specific disciplinary
actions are available when a Justice commits conduct unbecoming of
good behavior while in office. The Impeachment Clause of the
Constitution, however, empowers Congress to impeach and remove
from office all civil officers of the United States for conviction of treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.20 Because Supreme
Court Justices are civil officers of the United States, the Constitution
makes impeachment and removal from office the only political check
available to the legislative branch for regulating the behavior of Supreme
Court Justices.21

Justices and other federal judges serve life-time tenures unless their conduct falls below the
“good behaviour” threshold contemplated by the Framers. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
17
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
18
Id. § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).
19
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
20
Id. § 2, cl. 5.
21
See id. art. II, § 4. Other constitutional checks available to Congress with regards to
Supreme Court Justices are its power to control the size of the Court, thus affecting the
number of Justices required to constitute a quorum and the qualifications for serving as a
Justice. See Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards,
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Consequently, if the Court were to adopt its own code of conduct (as
will be discussed later) to use as guidance or as the sole governing
authority for making decisions that involve potential ethical concerns
(e.g., recusal, gifts, conflicts of interests, bias, etc.), the code would be, at
best, only aspirational and would have no authoritative or practical
effect on the individual Justices. As discussed earlier, attempting to
discipline a Justice for breach of an ethics code provision, short of
conduct that would constitute an offense sufficient to impeach and
remove the Justice from office (e.g., criminal actions brought against a
sitting Justice), would run contrary to the Framer’s intent for the
independence of the Court and the “clear institutional protections for
that independence” as provided for under the Constitution.22
Finally, as noted by Professor Lubet and legal scholars, any ethics
code and its enforceability against the Justices would be subject to
judicial review by the Court.23 Consequently, the Court would have the
final say in determining the constitutionality of any legislation, such as
H.R. 862, that would require the Court to adopt and adhere to the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges (“Code of Conduct”), notwithstanding the
fact that such a code would directly affect the Court’s own self-interest.
III. THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT TO
GOVERN SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
In his paper, Professor Lubet persuasively argues that the Supreme
Court should adopt a comprehensive code of conduct primarily to let the
public know what to expect from the Justices.24 In support of this
argument, he references both the letter submitted by law professors
across the country to the Chairman and ranking members of the U.S.
Senate and House Judiciary Committees, which requested the Justices
adopt mandatory and enforceable rules to protect the integrity of the
Court, and H.R. 862 (“Supreme Court Transparency and Disclosure Act
of 2011”), which would require that the Code of Conduct be applicable and

2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1221 (2011) (discussing several constitutional arguments made in
support of congressional involvement in the Supreme Court recusal process).
22
See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982) (noting
that the Constitution provides clear institutional protections for the independence of the
Court); see also Hopkins, supra note 3, at 908–10 (discussing Supreme Court discipline and
the Scalia-Cheney duck hunting trip).
23
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803) (upholding judicial
review of decisions of the executive and judicial branches as a proper function of the Court
under the Constitution); see also Lubet, supra note 3.
24
See Lubet, supra note 3, at 890–91.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss4/3

Hopkins: Supreme Court Leaks and Recusals: A Response to Professor Steven

2013]

Leaks and Recusals

931

enforceable against Supreme Court Justices.25 As additional support for
this position, Professor Lubet evaluates and critiques the response given
by Chief Justice Roberts in his 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, a response addressing recent public pressure and criticisms
lodged against the Court regarding its lack of a comprehensive code of
conduct and the Court’s recusal process.26
Professor Lubet correctly notes that the lower federal courts have
adopted the Code of Conduct, one that is similar to the ABA’s Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, which has been adopted by the various states.27 He
acknowledges that Supreme Court Justices may encounter issues and
situations that would never arise for federal and state court judges.28
However, he embraces the view that this fact alone provides little reason
for the Court’s refusal to adopt and abide by a comprehensive code of
judicial conduct.29 Professor Lubet concludes and implies, like many
others, that because the lower federal and state courts have adopted and
are subject to codes of judicial conduct, then it is reasonable and logical
that the Supreme Court act similarly and accordingly.30
Professor Lubet’s assessments and conclusions are reasonable and
facially valid. Chief Justice Roberts has noted that the Court does not
have to adopt a comprehensive code of ethics as its “definitive source of
ethical guidance,” primarily because it already considers not only the
Code of Conduct applicable to lower federal court judges, but also other
sources such as judicial opinions, treatises, scholarly articles, and
disciplinary decisions when deciding ethical issues.31 However, as
Professor Lubet specifically points out, these sources are equally
available to and utilized by lower federal and state court judges, yet this
has not prevented those judges from establishing and attempting to
follow a uniform and comprehensive ethics code.32

Id. at 887–88; see also supra notes 9–10 (discussing H.R. 862 and letters by law
professors to ranking members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees).
26
See Lubet, supra note 3, at 887–91 (discussing Chief Justice Robert’s 2011 Year-End
Report on the Federal Judicary and recusal challenges made during deliberations in NFIB v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566).
27
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (2011), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/CodesOfConduct/CodeConductUnitedState
sJudges.aspx#; ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibil
ity/2011_mcjc_table_of_contents.authcheckdam.pdf.
28
See Lubet, supra note 3, at 890–91.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 5.
32
Lubet, supra note 3, at 888.
25
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I agree with Professor Lubet on this point. Justice Roberts’s defense
for refusing to consider the value to be gained by adopting a
comprehensive code for the Court is very weak and simplistic. Even the
Chief Justice acknowledges that the Code of Conduct plays the same role
for the Justices as it does for other federal judges by providing guidance
on acceptable and unacceptable conduct.33 Although he suggests that
there is no need to adopt a specific code of conduct for the Court, there
seems to be no compelling reason provided in his annual report not to.
Because of the nature and the types of cases which are heard and
decided by the Court each year and the fact that the ramifications of
those decisions most often extend well past the litigants, the Court’s
adoption of its own code would serve as an additional reminder to the
public that the Justices too are mindful of the need to be impartial when
deciding all cases and would help to insure that their decisions are free
from the constraints of politics and outside influences.34
In further defense of the Court’s refusal to adopt a comprehensive
ethics code, Chief Justice Roberts notes that the Code of Conduct “cannot
answer all questions” and “does not adequately answer some of the
ethical considerations unique to the Supreme Court.”35 I agree with
Professor Lubet who correctly concludes that this would be the case,
however, for all judges who seriously strive towards justice, fairness,
and judicial integrity. Like any code of conduct, the Code followed by
the lower federal courts could be tweaked, revised, or altered to take into
consideration the special and unique ethical issues that arise in the
Supreme Court.
I also agree with Professor Lubet that it is the decision by the Court
to adopt a comprehensive code of conduct, and not so much as to what
that code would look like or actually include, that is really important.
No one code could encompass every possible ethical dilemma that a
judge may have to confront on any given day during her tenure on a
ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 5.
See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (reviewing the
constitutionality of an Arizona statute designed to address the growing number of
unlawful aliens in the state); NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (reviewing the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011) (reviewing the district court’s certification of a half million plaintiffs in a class action
suit); McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (reviewing the constitutionality of a
City of Chicago ordinance placing a ban on possession of handguns); Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (reviewing the constitutional limits on
electioneering communications and holding that the First Amendment prohibits
government from restricting independent political campaign expenditures by corporations
and unions); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the affirmative action
admissions policies at the University of Michigan Law School).
35
ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 5.
33
34
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court. However, the Supreme Court’s adoption of a comprehensive code
would help to guarantee greater uniformity, consistency, and integrity in
its handling of these unique concerns.
An important concern that Professor Lubet spends very little time
addressing, however, is the constitutionality of his proposal that the
Court adopt a code of conduct. Such a proposal could raise a significant
constitutional issue if the adoption of a code of conduct is legislatively
mandated (as contemplated by the drafters of H.R. 862) or self-imposed
by the Court. A legislatively mandated code, as contemplated by the
drafters of H.R. 862, would pose serious constitutional problems.36
As Chief Justice Roberts has indicated, Article III of the Constitution
creates only one court that is the Supreme Court of the United States,
and it empowers Congress to establish additional lower federal courts.37
Although it is within Congress’s power to create the Judicial Conference
and provide direction to this entity, the Conference and its members
would have no constitutional authority to prescribe rules and standards
for the Supreme Court.38 Under the nation’s governmental structure, the
judiciary is the body that normally creates rules that govern its
operation—not the legislature. Introducing and enacting legislation
designed to require that the Supreme Court adopt and comply with the
Code of Conduct would run afoul of Article III’s mandate that the “judicial
Power of the United States” be vested in one Supreme Court, the
Framer’s intent to create the independence necessary for the Court to act
as the check on both branches of the national government, and the
separation of powers envisioned by the Framers when they created the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of our governmental
structure.39 Finally, any legislative action purporting to require the
Court to adopt the Code of Conduct would be subject to judicial review by
the Court.40
IV. SUPREME COURT RECUSAL PRACTICE
Lastly, Professor Lubet argues that the Court’s current recusal
practices are in need of reform.41 He contends that the Court’s longstanding practice when considering a party’s request for recusal or an
See supra note 10 (discussing H.R. 862).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
38
Id.; see also ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 4 (referencing Article III’s provision providing
Congress the ability to create lower federal courts and its power to create the Judicial
Conference).
39
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
40
See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing judicial review).
41
Lubet, supra note 3, at 891–902.
36
37
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individual Justice’s decision to step down from participating in a case
based upon personal bias—such as previous involvement in the
litigation prior to his or her appointment to the bench or other conflicts—
has been one that is secretive and left entirely to the Justice in question.42
He argues that the Supreme Court’s recusal process is inconsistent and
problematic.43 Unlike lower federal and state courts where recusal
decisions may be reviewed by higher courts or the chief judge, the
Supreme Court has no review process in place.44 Finally, as a possible
solution against individual decision-making by the Justices on the issue
of recusals, Professor Lubet suggests that the Court could adopt a
process that would require either full Supreme Court review on the issue
of disqualification of a member Justice or a more radical process that
might require retired Justices and senior circuit court judges to
participate in a Justice’s denial of a recusal motion.45
Section 455 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides direction and
guidance for lower-ranking federal court judges in determining whether
a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be compromised, thus requiring
the judge to recuse herself from the proceeding.46 The statute requires
disqualification, for example, where a judge’s impartiality might

Id. at 894–95.
Id.
44
Id. at 895–97.
45
Id.; H.R. 862, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(2)–(b) (2011). Section 3(a)(2) through (b) of
H.R. 862 provides:
(a)(2)
DENIAL OF DISQUALIFICATION MOTION—If a justice of
the Supreme Court denies a motion brought by a party to a
proceeding before the Court that the justice should be
disqualified in the proceeding under section 455 of such title,
the justice shall disclose in the public record of the
proceeding the reasons for the denial of the motion.
(b)
PROCESS FOR DETERMINING RECUSAL—The Judicial
Conference of the United States shall establish a process
under which, if a disqualification motion has been denied as
described in subsection (a)(2) and the party making the
motion seeks further review of the motion, other justices or
judges of a court of the United States (as defined in section
451 of title 28, United States Code), among whom retired
justices and senior judges eligible for assignment under
section 294 of title 28, United States Code, may be included,
shall decide whether the justice with respect to whom the
motion is made should be so disqualified.
Id.
46
See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.”).
42
43
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reasonably be questioned.47 Although the statute on its face includes the
term “justice,” which is defined to include the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,48 the Supreme Court has not
spoken on the constitutionality of this statute. Consequently, the Court’s
actions have implied that the statute, with respect to lower federal court
judges, would be an appropriate exercise of congressional powers.
Although Chief Justice Roberts has stated that the Code of Conduct
applies only to lower federal court judges, he has indicated that the
Justices follow the same general principles respecting recusal as other
federal judges, but the application of those principals may differ
depending on the unique circumstances of the Supreme Court.49 As
previously discussed, Article III gives Congress the power to create
additional lower federal courts, and the Judicial Conference of the
United States was established for the sole benefit of those federal
courts.50 Consequently, the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes
of Conduct has no power to mandate or prescribe rules or standards for
any other body.51 Justice Roberts acknowledges, however, that the Court
has internally agreed to apply the disqualification standards of the Code
of Conduct imposed upon lower federal court judges in the areas of
financial disclosures and limitations on gifts and outside income.52
On March 1, 2011, House of Representative Members Chris Murphy
and Anthony Weiner introduced the Supreme Court Transparency and
Disclosure Act of 2011, a bill designed to require that the Code of Conduct
be applied to the Justices of the Supreme Court and to articulate a set of
formal procedures for the recusal of Justices.53 House Bill 862 would
require that: (1) the Code of Conduct for federal judges apply to the
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to the same extent as it would apply
to circuit and district court judges; (2) the Judicial Conference establish
procedures for handling complaints alleging that a Justice has violated
the Code of Conduct and take appropriate actions with respect to those
complaints; (3) Justices who disqualify themselves disclose the reason for
the disqualification in the public record of the proceeding; (4) Justices
who deny a motion for disqualification brought by a party against the
Justice under § 455 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code disclose the reasons for
denial of the motion in the public record of the proceeding; and (5) the
47
See id. § 455(b) (providing a list of circumstances for which disqualification would be
required).
48
See 28 U.S.C. § 451 (2006).
49
ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 5.
50
See supra note 12.
51
ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 4.
52
Id. at 6.
53
See supra note 10.
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Judicial Conference establish a formalized process for addressing review
of a Justice’s denial of a disqualification motion lodged against the
Justice.54
Once again, imposing or mandating legislatively created procedures
or rules to govern Supreme Court recusals runs afoul of Article III’s
mandate that the power of the judicial branch shall be vested in “one”
Supreme Court.55 Similar to the promulgation of judicial codes of
conduct, decisions regarding recusals fall within the constitutional
parameters of the judicial branch of our national government.56 Clearly,
the Court has the ability to decide upon the process that it will use for
handling recusals.57 Thus, a legislatively imposed requirement that the
Court adopt the Code of Judicial Conduct of United States Judges, as would
be the case under H.R. 862, would trigger separation of powers concerns
as outlined in Article III of the Constitution.58
Furthermore, imposing the requirements of H.R. 862 or similar
legislative provisions requiring the creation of review panels consisting
of lower federal courts, such as the chief judge of the court of appeals
and members of U.S. district courts, or having the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court evaluate a Justice’s decision to recuse herself when
requested by a litigant in a proceeding or a Justice’s individual decision
to recuse herself from participating in a proceeding, would not only
create the awkward situation of placing members of the lower courts in
the position to review a Supreme Court Justice’s recusal decision, but
also having the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court review and make
decisions as to whether an individual Justice would or should have to
recuse herself.59 Each of these scenarios infringe upon the Court’s
powers under Article III and the independence envisioned by the
Framers when they created the Constitution. Lastly, under its powers of
judicial review, the Court would have the final say with regards to the
constitutionality of any legislative enactment requiring it to act similarly
to lower federal court judges when determining disqualification or when
ruling on recusal motions by litigants.

H.R. 862, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011).
See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text (discussing Article III of the U.S.
Constitution).
56
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See Savage, supra note 3, at A-12 (discussing Vice President Dick Cheney’s hunting
trip with Justice Antonin Scalia). In defending Justice Scalia’s actions, the late Chief Justice
William Rehnquist stated that there were no formal procedures for in-house review by the
Court of the decisions of a Justice in an individual case and that it was ill-considered for the
Senators to suggest that Justice Scalia recuse himself in the pending litigation. Id.
54
55

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss4/3
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V. CONCLUSION
Professor Lubet has raised a badly needed dialogue on the Supreme
Court’s lack of a comprehensive code of conduct and its failure to act
consistently with regards to handling ethical issues that arise before it.60
As noted by Professor Lubet, the Chief Justice’s reasoning in support of
the Court’s decision not to adopt a code, or to create more transparency
with regards to the current recusal process, is unpersuasive at best.61
Yes, the Supreme Court is in a unique position under the Constitution,
and legislation designed to require the Court to adopt the Code of Conduct
would raise serious constitutional issues. This, however, does not or
should not prevent the Court from adopting and promulgating its own
code of conduct.
As noted by the Chief Justice, a code of conduct is “designed to
provide guidance to judges.”62 As Professor Lubet concludes, the
adoption of a comprehensive code by the Court is simply the right thing
to do.63 It would tend to create greater transparency regarding the
Court’s handling of ethical concerns and greater consistency amongst the
Justices when dealing with issues such as recusal. Finally, the Court’s
adoption of its own code of conduct would begin the process of
removing much of the secrecy that currently exists with respect to the
Court’s recusal and disqualification practices—secrecy that so often
creates public outcry when members of the Court act in ways that create
the appearance of impropriety.
As evidenced in the Chief Justice’s report, the Court does care about
the public’s perception of the integrity of its members.64 Thus, my
suggestion to Professor Lubet and others who care about fairness and the
integrity of the Court would be to continue to keep these important
ethical issues in the public eye. As discussed previously, although a
legislatively mandated code or requirement that the Court adopt a code
of conduct could be problematic, applying public pressure on the Court
to adopt its own code would be both feasible and appropriate. If the
public letter submitted by law professors to high-ranking members of
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees was sufficient to prompt the
Chief Justice to respond officially, then what would be the effect of
letters from state supreme court and lower court judges requesting the
Court to adopt a code of ethics and to rethink its current recusal and

60
61
62
63
64

See generally Lubet, supra note 3.
Id.
ROBERTS, supra note 11, at 4 (citation omitted).
Lubet, supra note 3, at 904–05.
See generally ROBERTS, supra note 11.
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disqualification process? The Court’s response and answer to this
important question might very well be surprising.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss4/3

